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Article
TOP TENS IN 2016:
PATENT, TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND TRADE
SECRET CASES
Stephen McJohn*
ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court issued several rulings that affect
incentives in patent law. The Court relaxed the standard for the award of
treble damages, narrowed the damages awards for infringement of design
patents, and upheld key parts of the new procedures for challenging the
validity of patents before the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO). After numerous decisions holding claimed inventions to be
outside patentable subject matter in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2014
Alice decision, the Federal Circuit rejected some challenges on those
grounds, evincing a split among the circuit’s judges on the bounds of
patentable subject matter. Several decisions affected legal boundaries:
whether federal copyright law preempted state law rights for resale
royalties and right of publicity, and whether trade secret law preempted
claims for unjust enrichment. Courts continue the trend to limit injunctions,
where parties have delayed or seek overbroad orders. Trademark decisions
stretched the limits of the Lanham Act, to reach foreign sales of goods
bought in the US and protection of foreign marks within the US, as well as
to trigger nationwide US trademark protection upon the most minor use of
a mark. In copyright, evergreen issues include the scope of fair use and the
conditions for immunity for internet service providers. Trade secret saw a
new federal trade secret act, along with cases on all the major elements of
trade secret misappropriation in such areas as beehive foraging and bacon
cooking.
This paper uses the collection of cases to conjecture a little on
cognitive factors that affect judicial reasoning. Judges have the same
cognitive biases as other humans. We can read judicial decisions,
speculatively, with an eye toward how the judges unconsciously seek
*
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cognitive ease. The paper also discusses how the holdings of some cases
may affect the subsequent decision process in some intellectual property
matters.
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I. PATENT
A. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.1
Several notable recent Supreme Court cases in patent law tend to
weaken the power of patent holders. Alice,2 along with this term’s Cuozzo
and Apple decisions cut back on patentable subject matter. Halo, by
contrast, strengthens patents by reducing the showing required to recover
treble damages. The Federal Circuit had followed a test requiring
“objective recklessness,” meaning that there would not be enhanced
damages if there was a substantial question as to validity of the patent or
infringement by the defendant.3The Supreme Court rejected that test as too
rigid. The Court agreed that treble damages should be granted only in
egregious cases, but held the determination of whether a case was
egregious should be left to the discretion of the trial court, guided by the
factors identified in the case law, not the strict determination of objective
recklessness.4 As in several cases discussed below, the Supreme Court was
less concerned than the appellate court that trial judges would unfairly use
hindsight to second-guess the decisions of parties in intellectual property
litigation. The Halo effect5 on litigants may be to discourage litigation for
better (where clear infringers abandon meritless defenses) or worse (where
non-infringers settle litigation or agree to licenses for fear of treble
damages). Without enhanced damages, a defendant with a weak case
nevertheless has a strong bargaining position. A party facing a likely loss
(the defendant) is likely to be risk-seeking (amenable to taking chances to
1

Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
3
Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1923, (discussing In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F. 3d 1360, 1368, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)).
4
Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932–35.
5
Not to be confused with the “halo effect” in psychology. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING
FAST AND SLOW82–85 (2011).
2
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avoid liability), where a plaintiff with a strong case is likely to be riskavoiding (amenable to settling for a lower amount than its expected gains,
to avoid even the small chance of losing).6 The second scenario would
seem less likely. Even if Halo lowers the bar for treble damages, the
standard is still egregiousness, and few possible infringers will think
themselves likely to fit that standard.
B. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee7
The 2011 America Invents Act (AIA) introduced post-grant
challenges to the United States patent system. Before the AIA, litigation
was the only route to invalidate a patent, by raising invalidity, in an
infringement case or by filing a declaratory judgment action. The AIA
allowed anyone to file an administrative proceeding before the USPTO,
seeking a declaration that a patent was invalid (although the grounds
available are narrower than those in litigation). The Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (PTAB) has invalidated numerous patents. The hundreds of postgrant proceedings that were initiated are now yielding many appeals to the
Federal Circuit followed by petitions to the Supreme Court. Cuozzo, was
the Supreme Court’s first opinion in a post-grant proceeding. The Court
upheld key aspects of the PTAB’s implementation of post-grant
procedures. First, the PTAB may use the broadest reasonable construction
of patent claims, an approach which tends to help challengers. Broader
claims are more likely to be anticipated by earlier technology. Second, the
Court affirmed the PTAB’s application of the statue to hold that decisions
to initiate proceedings are not appealable. Implicitly, the Court rejected the
view of post-grant proceedings stated by the dissent below, which
compared them to substitutes for trial in district court. Rather, the Court
treated them as a different creature, proceedings within an administrative
agency. That makes it more likely post-grant proceedings will survive the
challenge that they represent an unconstitutional delegation of Article III
judicial powers. The Court had ruled that Congress had impermissibly
vested judicial power in bankruptcy courts by allowing them to resolve
state law tort claims. By contrast, the PTAB is strictly limited to reviewing
decisions of patentability, which would seem well within the recognized
exceptions.

6

See Kahneman, supra note 5, at 319–20 (discussing Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk
Preference & the Law, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1115 (2003).
7
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
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C. Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corporation8
Congress created the post-grant proceedings as exemplified in Cuozzo
partly as a response to what some term “patent trolls,” parties extracting
licensing fees by wielding patents of dubious validity. Unlike litigation,
there is no standing requirement for post-grant challenge. Rather, it is an
administrative procedure that may be initiated by anyone. This made
possible what some have termed “PTAB trolls,” parties that initiate postgrant proceedings against a patent (most likely a highly valuable patent
such as a popular pharmaceutical) purely as an investment device: “The
Coalition for Affordable Drugs, a wholly owned subsidiary of Bass’s
Hayman Credes Master Fund LP, has challenged numerous drug patents at
PTAB, reportedly as part of a short-selling strategy aimed at driving down
the price of drug company stocks.”9 In Celgene, the PTAB determined that
that the claims were not patentable. From a policy point of view, one could
argue that the case simply shows the procedures provide incentives for
challenges to patents that should not have issued, not limited to those
directly affected by the patents, such as competitors or end users of the
invention.
Celgene can appeal the invalidation of its patent to the Federal Circuit.
Had Celgene won, the challenger likely could not have appealed the
decision, under the holding in Phigenix.10 Anyone can challenge a patent’s
validity before the USPTO, an Article I body. But an appeal to a court
requires the party to meet the requirements of Article III standing, a
particularized harm from the patent (such as a claim of infringement.) So
the mix of cases that reach the Federal Circuit will not include unsuccessful
challenges brought by parties not involved in an actual controversy
involving the patent.
D. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc.11
Samsung copied the patented design of Apple’s iPhone. The question
on appeal was whether damages would be reckoned by considering the
market for smartphones, or just by the amount properly apportioned to the
shape of the iPhone, as opposed to its other features, such as software.
Samsung rejected a line of cases holding that, in design patent infringement
cases, the proper measure of damages was the infringer’s total profits from
8

IPR2015-01092 (October 26, 2016).
Kevin Penton, Celgene Wants PTAB Rethink On Bass’ Cancer Drug IP Win, LAW360
(November 28, 2016) https://www.law360.com/articles/866321/celgene-wants-ptab-rethink-on-basscancer-drug-ip-win [https://perma.cc/5BLF-5VV9].
10
Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
11
Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
9
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the relevant product. The statute does appear to grant total profits: one who
makes or sells “any article of manufacture to which [a patented] design or
colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the
extent of his total profit.”12 But the Court held that the relevant “article of
manufacture” was not the product (the iPhone) but rather the component
embodying the patented design. Accordingly, the Court held that where a
product has multiple components, damages would be the portion of profits
allocable to the component with the infringed design. So, when Samsung
infringed the design patent of the Apple iPhone shape, profits would be
reckoned by the component, not the entire phone.
E. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.13
In recent years, the Federal Circuit has held dozens of patents invalid
for failing to claim patentable subject matter under the 2014 Supreme Court
decision Alice Corp. v. CLS.14 This year saw the pendulum swing back with
the Federal Circuit upholding patents, as in Enfish, that were not much
different than ones previously invalidated.15 Enfish also shows the Federal
Circuit struggling to apply the test from Alice. Alice held outside patentable
subject matter patent “claims . . . designed to facilitate the exchange of
financial obligations between two parties by using a computer system as a
third-party intermediary.”16 The Court formulated a two-part test from its
earlier cases:
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those
patent-ineligible concepts [Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas]. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” To
answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both
individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the
additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible
application.”17
12

Id. at 432 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 289).
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
14
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2347; Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit’s Internal Debate of Eligibility
Continues, PATENTLY-O (November 16, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/11/internal-eligibilitycontinues.html [https://perma.cc/N4J3-6QRN].
15
Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1338-39 (upholding method of implementing self-referential database);
Planet Blue, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (upholding patent on “Method for Automatically
Animating Lip Synchronization and Facial Expression of Animated Characters.”); Bascom Glob.
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (upheld patent on method
of providing customized filters for internet users); Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841
F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (upholding related patents for aggregating, reporting, and controlling data in
a network environment).
16
Alice 134 S. Ct. at 2352.
17
Id. at 2355 (citations omitted).
13
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The claims met the first test, being “drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement,” an abstract idea.18 Nor did they supply an
“inventive concept,” under the second step: “The method claims do not, for
example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. . . . Nor
do they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field.”19
Enfish applied the second part of the Alice test to see if the claims met
the first part of the test: “Therefore, we find it relevant to ask whether the
claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality versus
being directed to an abstract idea, even at the first step of the Alice
analysis.”20 The claims were deemed to be “directed to a specific
improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in the selfreferential table.”21 That seems to suggest that any method that improves
computer functionality (as opposed to a method simply implemented on a
computer) would survive the Alice test. But that seems hard to square with
Benson,22 which held that method for converting binary numbers, a key
method for improving computer functioning, was a nonpatentable abstract
idea. In any case, it seems that identifying an idea, for the relatively new
test for patentable subject matter, will be no easier than in copyright, which
likewise excludes ideas from protection, without any definition of “idea.”23
F. LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc.24
Meanwhile, a number of cases continued to invalidate patents as
claiming unpatentable subject matter, including some patents that would
have broad scope.25 LendingTree is a good example. The claim was
directed to an abstract idea; namely, a loan-application clearinghouse or, more
simply, coordinating loans. Indeed, claim 1 is directed to a practice similar to
“fundamental economic practice[s]” found abstract by the Supreme
Court. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. Like the concepts of risk hedging in Bilski,
561 U.S. at 611, and intermediated settlement in Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356, the
18

Id. at 2356.
Id. at 2359 (citations and quotation omitted).
20
Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335.
21
Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336.
22
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63(1972).
23
See Stephen McJohn, Scary Patents, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 343 (2009).
24
LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x 991 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
25
See, e.g., DataTreasury Corp. v. Fid. Nat’l Info. Servs., 669 F. Appn’x 572 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(invalidating patent claiming method of creating and storing digital images of checks and other
transferring user financial documents); Lending Tree v. Zillow, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13462 (Fed.
Cir. July 25, 2016) (invalidating patent on loan clearinghouse or method of coordinating loans); TLI
Commc’ns LLC v. AV Auto., L.L.C., 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (invalidating patent on method of
classifying data with timestamp); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (invalidating patent on method of testing for errors in integrated circuit designs).
19
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concept of applying for loans and receiving offers is also long prevalent in our
financial system.26

Nor did the claim direct that abstract idea to a specific patent-eligible
application. The case illustrates well how Alice has provided a
straightforward means to bar overly broad patents, whereas in the past it
would have been necessary to show that the invention was not new or was
obvious, issues which require establishing the extent of the relevant prior
art.
G. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. CellzDirect, Inc.27
Alice, Enfish and LendingTree all concerned whether the patent at
issue impermissibly claimed an abstract idea. The Alice test applies to three
nonpatentable areas: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.
The Supreme Court’s 2012 Prometheus decision cast doubt on the
patentability methods in the life sciences, especially diagnostic methods (a
large class, including many inventions directed to personalized medicine)
and other life sciences inventions. Just as Alice did not define an “idea,”
Prometheus did not define a “law of nature.” The claimed method in that
case was using the results of a test for the level of a metabolite in a
patient’s blood to prescribe the dosage of a pharmaceutical. Alice identified
the abstract idea in the case, the concept of intermediated settlement.
Prometheus held that the claimed method impermissibly claimed a law of
nature, but did not identify the law of nature. The patentee evidently
believed that certain dosages would be more effective, but had not
enunciated a law of nature that directed that result. So, Prometheus left
application of the rule very undefined.
CellzDirect upheld a patent on preserving a type of liver cell, in the
face of the argument that it was directed at an unpatentable law of nature.
The inventors had discovered that, contrary to belief in the field, that some
fraction of the cells would survive being frozen and thawed multiple times.
They patented the process of “(A) subjecting previously frozen and thawed
cells to density gradient fractionation to separate viable cells from nonviable ones; (B) recovering the viable cells; and (C) refreezing the viable
cells.”28 The court held that the claim was not directed at the discovery, but
was rather were “directed to a new and useful laboratory technique for
preserving hepatocytes.”29 Notably, the court did not consider what Alice

26
27
28
29
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identified as the key policy issue, whether the patent would effectively
preempt the field, giving the inventors a monopoly on their discovery.30
H. UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co.31

A key step in patent litigation is claim interpretation—determining the
scope of the patent claims. In interpreting claims, most cases state that
reference to the written description in the patent is necessary only if the
claims are ambiguous or otherwise require additional interpretive
material.32 UltimatePointer seems to take a broader approach. The court
limited claims to the description of the invention in the patent application’s
specification, without first determining that the claims were ambiguous.
The question was whether the term “handheld device” in the claim meant a
“handheld direct pointing device.”33 The court held it was, because the
invention described in the written description was a direct-pointing system
and the description disparaged indirect-pointing systems.34

30

Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“We have described the
concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of pre-emption.”).
31
UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co., 816 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
32
See SimpleAir, Inc. v. Sony Ericsson Mobile Commc’ns. AB, 820 F.3d 419 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 816 F.3d 788 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (discussing a patent on “quick links,”
“slide to unlock” and “word recommendations”).
33
UltimatePointer, 816 F.3d at 823.
34
Id.
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Drawing from U.S. Patent No. 7,121,489 in Allied Erecting
I. Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp.35 Allied Erecting &
Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Attachments, LLC36
Both cases show how courts must sometimes deal with readings that
lead to illogical results. Trustees of Columbia held that a claim that, applied
to the real world, would be nonsensical: “the claims describe the step of
extracting machine code instructions from something that does not have
machine code instructions. . . . The claims are nonsensical in the way a
claim to extracting orange juice from apples would be, and are thus
indefinite.”37 Allied Erecting dealt with the argument that an invention
could not be rendered obvious by combining features from two previous
references, where those devices could not have been physically combined.
The court reasoned that the impossibility argument was a red herring, if it
would be obvious to combine features from the two devices to make the
invention.38

35
36

Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Attachments, LLC, 825 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir.

2016).
37
38
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J. Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc.39

U.S. Patent No. 5,859,636, The key piece of prior art in Arendi.
The PTAB has, under the new post-grant proceedings, invalidated
many patents as obvious. Arendi signals that the Federal Circuit will
require convincing reasons. The Supreme Court established in KSR40 that
common sense may be used in finding a patent obvious, meaning that
obviousness does not require that there be teaching, suggestion or
motivation in the prior art to make the invention. The issue in Arendi was
whether it would be obvious, based on common sense, to add the option to
search for a telephone number detected in a document, when the “Add to
address book” option is chosen, in the image above.41 Under Arendi, it is
not enough simply to state that the invention is obvious: “Based on this
prior precedent, we conclude that while ‘common sense’ can be invoked,
even potentially to supply a limitation missing from the prior art, it must
still be supported by evidence and a reasoned explanation.”42

39
40
41
42

Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Id. at1363.
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II. TRADEMARK

Real McCoy?
A. Free Kick Master LLC v. Apple Inc.43
Is an app store like a swap meet? Some owners of swap meets have
been held secondarily liable for trademark infringement by sellers at the
meet.44 The owner of the Free Kick Master mark brought an action on that
theory against Apple, Google, and Amazon, on whose sites various
infringing apps could be found. But, unlike the swap meet cases, the
defendants did not have knowledge of the infringing activity, a requirement
for contributory liability. So the common law standard for secondary
liability in trademark hinges on the extent of knowledge, which is the key
issue in copyright cases as well, although under the statutory scheme
providing immunity for internet service providers, discussed below.
B. Sunearth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co.45
In 2014, the Supreme Court in Octane Fitness46 announced a more
flexible standard for awarding attorney’s fees in patent cases, holding that
the trial court should look to the totality of the circumstances. Extending to
trademark law the standard for awarding attorney’ fees awards in patent
cases. Octane Fitness rejected the standard applied by the Federal Circuit
as “unduly rigid,” a characterization the Court has often used in rejecting
the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of intellectual property law. Sunearth
followed other circuit courts in applying the Octane Fitness standard,
43
44
45
46
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Free Kick Master LLC v. Apple Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25478 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016).
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
Sunearth Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., 839 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014),
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announced in a patent case, to trademark cases under the Lanham Act. The
rule may be particularly apt in adjusting the incentives for trademark
owners, providing an apt counter to the loss aversion and over-weight of
risk that may lead some trademark owners to pursue baseless claims of
trademark infringement.47
C. Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com 48
The holder of the FyreTV mark for streaming video services filed a
trademark infringement action about two weeks after Amazon began using
the mark, Amazon Fire TV.49 The plaintiff then did little for five months,
and then filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.50 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed denial of the injunction, because the unexplained delay showed
that the plaintiff was not at risk of imminent irreparable harm, a necessary
showing.51
D. Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt52
Trader Joe’s also tested the limits of trademark law. The Ninth Circuit
held there was sufficient effect on United States commerce to bring a
trademark infringement action under the Lanham Act, where the defendant
allegedly purchased Trader Joe’s goods in the US and resold them using
that trademark at “Pirate Joe’s” in Canada, without adhering to quality
controls.
E. Uber Promotions, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc.53
Like Wreal, Uber Promotions concerned the ability to use trademark
rights to get an injunction, testing the property rights of intellectual
property. The court declined to give Uber Promotions (a seller of party bus
services in Gainesville, Florida) a statewide injunction against Uber
Technologies (“a nationally known taxi-like service”). As the court put it,
“a preliminary injunction should not serve as a bazooka in the hands of a

47

See Jessica M. Kiser, To Bully or Not To Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty in
Trademark Enforcement Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211 (2014) (applying concepts of
overweighting improbable losses and loss aversion from Kahneman, supra note 5).
48
Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, 840 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2016).
49
Id. at 1247.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1247–49.
52
Trader Joe’s v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Re-Opening Progress Shots,
PIRATE JOE’S, http://www.piratejoes.ca/ [https://perma.cc/8KY8-4SZP] (photos of Pirate Joe’s, changed
to Irate Joe’s after the lawsuit).
53
Uber Promotions, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1253 (N.D. Fla. 2016).
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squirrel.” Notably, Uber Promotions relied only on its common law priority
based on local use, and had not made a federal registration.
F. Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG 54
Intellectual property law is territorial, meaning rights under US
trademark law apply within the US. A mark recognized in another
jurisdiction may, for lack of use in the US, not qualify for protection in the
US. A recurring issue is, to what extent can the foreign mark owner prevent
uses in the US that may be confusing to consumers. Belmora held that the
holder of a foreign trademark not used in US may bring action for
trademark cancellation, false association, and false advertising
G. Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG55

ADD A ZERO hats56
Trademark rights depend on use of the mark. Common law rights
obtain in the geographical area of actual use, but federal registration gives
priority nationwide. The issue in Christian Faith Fellowship was, how
much use is necessary to support registration. The court held that “the
Church’s sale of two “ADD A ZERO”-marked hats to an out-of-state
resident is within the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause and,
therefore, constitutes ‘use in commerce’ under the Lanham Act,” which
was sufficient to support registration of the ADD A ZERO mark.57 The
court refused to adopt a de minimis test, on the grounds that Lanham Act
registration applied to the extent of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers,

54

Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 2016).
Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
56
Alex MacKay, Use It (in Commerce) or Lose It!, TRADEMARKOLOGY (Dec. 1, 2016),
http://www.trademarkologist.com/2016/12/use-it-in-commerce-or-lose-it/
[https://perma.cc/N8ZKJRYM].
57
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20382 at 15.
55
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and that sales to an out of state resident were comfortably within the
powers of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.58
H. Mission Prod. Holdings v. Tempnology LLC (In re Tempnology LLC)59
When an intellectual property licensor goes into bankruptcy, the rights
of licensees are protected. The policy is sound. The Bankruptcy Code could
simply leave it to the debtor in possession and the licensee to negotiate a
resolution, but negotiating over allocating losses is much more difficult
than negotiating over allocating gain.60 But in the relevant definition of
“intellectual property,” Congress did not include trademark. Mission
Products finessed that definition, holding that rights of trademark licensee
are not protected in licensee’s bankruptcy by the Bankruptcy Code, because
trademark is not included in the relevant Bankruptcy Code definition of
“intellectual property,” but that the rights may still survive bankruptcy.61
Notably, trade secrets are included in the definition in the Bankruptcy
Code, but the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 provides that it “shall not
be construed to be a law pertaining to intellectual property,”62 creating a
potential conflict between two federal statutes.
I. In re JobDiva, Inc.63

Mark as reproduced in Fed. Cir. Opinion
Like Christian Faith Fellowship Church, JobDiva rejects stringent use
requirements for registration of a mark. The Trademark Trial and Appeal
58

2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20382 at 17–19.
2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4025 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016)
60
Kahneman, supra note 5, at 304.
61
Mission Prod. Holdings, 559 B.R. 809 at 822.
62
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–153, sec. 2, § 1836(g), 130 Stat. 376; see
also Eric Goldman, Federal Trade Secret Bill Re-Introduced—And It’s Still Troublesome, TECH. &
MARKETING L. BLOG (August 4, 2015), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/08/federal-tradesecret-bill-re-introduced-and-its-still-troublesome-guest-blog-post.htm [https://perma.cc/3U4E-LFS3]
(quoting Dave Levine & Sharon Sandeen’s open letter analyzing the bill: “The purpose of this language
is unclear, but not labeling trade secrets as intellectual property is consistent with the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”), Article 39.”).
63
In re JobDiva, Inc., 843 F.3d 936 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
59
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Board cancelled the JobDiva service mark registered in the category
of personnel placement and recruitment services, because JobDiva did not
sell such services to its customers, rather sold software services used by the
customers to provide such services. 64 The court, by contrast, took a broader
view of software eligibility for service mark registration, holding that the
registrant need not provide such services separately from the provision of
software.65 The case has implications beyond registration. Infringement
depends on a likelihood of confusion, which is more likely if the relevant
marks are used in similar categories. Under the reasoning of JobDiva, a
mark for software used to support services could be more readily infringed
by a non-software vendor using a similar mark to provide those services.
J. Phoenix Ent. Partners, LLC. v. Rumsey66 Warner Bros. Entertainment,
Inc. v. X One X Productions 67
One trademark casebook was quick to juxtapose these two cases.68
Dastar69 held that a trademark claim could not be used for what was really
a copyright issue, the allegation that copies of public domain copyrighted
films were sold in a way that mislead the public, because they were not
sold by the former copyright holder. Dastar rejected that theory, because
otherwise trademark could be used to give the equivalent of copyright
protection.70 In Phoenix, a vendor of karaoke tracks sued bars that used
copies of those tracks, made without the vendor’s permission. The vendor
did not claim copyright in the karaoke tracks, but alleged trademark
infringement, because its trademark would appear to users when the tracks
were played. The court rejected the claim, reasoning that consumers would
not be confused about who produced the tracks, rather that the trademark
claim sought the equivalent of copyright, the exclusive right to perform the
works in public.71
X One X, by contrast, applied trademark to elements from copyrighted
works. The defendants licensed well-known phrases and character images
from such works as Gone with the Wind, The Wizard of Oz, and Tom and
Jerry cartoons, to the discernment of Warner Brothers, who owned the
relevant copyrights. In addition to copyright claims, Warner Brothers
64

Id. at 936–37.
Id. at 941–42.
66
Phx. Entm’t, LLC v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2016).
67
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 840 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2016).
68
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY 36, 46 (4th ed., Spring 2017)
69
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
70
Id. at 37–38.
71
Phx., 829 F.3d at 829–30.
65
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brought trademark claims. Unlike the content of the copyrighted works in
Dastar, however, those phrases and character images had been used for
trademark purposes and registered as trademarks.72
III. COPYRIGHT
A. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.73
In Halo, the Court held that the trial court has discretion to identify
egregious cases meriting award of treble damages for patent infringement.74
Kirtsaeng addressed another key aspect of attorney’s fee awards. Kirtsaeng
is a copyright case, but as Sunearth indicates, the holding will likely apply
in other areas of intellectual property. Kirtsaeng held that attorney’s fees
may be awarded, even if a party was reasonable in being mistaken about
whether there was infringement in the case. The plaintiff publisher had
sued Kirtsaeng for importing foreign-made copies of its books. The case
went all the way to the Supreme Court, because courts had split on
copyright holder. On remand, the court denied the defendant’s application
for attorney’s fees, on the grounds that the publisher had been objectively
reasonable in pursuing a theory that was accepted by many courts. The case
made its way to the Supreme Court again, which held that objective
reasonableness was relevant, but that all relevant factors should be
considered (akin to the holding in Halo on treble damages awards for
infringement).75 The Court recognized that the “objective-reasonableness
approach that Wiley favors passes that test because it both encourages
parties with strong legal positions to stand on their rights and deters those
with weak ones from proceeding with litigation. When a litigant—whether
plaintiff or defendant—is clearly correct, the likelihood that he will recover
fees from the opposing (i.e., unreasonable) party gives him an incentive to
litigate the case all the way to the end.”76 But the Court held that objective
reasonableness should be only one factor, not necessarily controlling, and
“courts must view all the circumstances of a case on their own terms, in
light of the Copyright Act’s essential goals.”77 That rule means that even a
party with a strong legal position may end up paying the other party’s
attorney’s fees – perhaps a useful nudge away from the overconfidence in

72
73
74
75
76
77

X One X, 840 F.3d at 979–80.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016).
See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
Kirtsaeng, 136 S.Ct. at 1988.
Id.
Id. at 1989.
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their assessments that is common among experts. 78 Overconfidence is
perhaps necessary for entrepreneurs or marketers,79 but not may not be
helpful to the dynamics of litigation, with its attendant costs.
B. VMG, LLC v. Ciccone80

Image from the VMG opinion.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films’s81 strict approach of
“sampling is infringement,” has greatly influenced music licensing and
production, leading to lower rates of sampling in popular music, especially
hip hop. VMG v. Ciccone held the opposite, that the de minimis rule
authorized use of small sample of copyrighted sound recording, in a song
by Madonna. The producer of Madonna’s song Vogue had used a 0.23second segment of horns from an earlier song, known as Love Break, and

78
79
80
81

94

Kahneman, supra note 5, at 262–63.
Id.
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
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used a modified version of that snippet when recording Vogue.” This
holding creates a split among the circuits.
C. TCA TV Corp. v. McCollum82
When faced with a difficult question, people often shift to answering a
simpler question.83 Courts seem to do so in applying fair use. To determine
whether fair use applies, Section 107 of the Copyright Act instructs courts
to consider four factors, without any specific guidance as to how to weigh
those factors.84 Courts in fair use cases have placed great emphasis on
whether a use is considered “transformative.”85 TCA TV held that fair use
did not necessarily protect incorporating portions of Abbott and Costello’s
“Who’s on First?” routine into a Broadway play. The use (an introverted
student performs both roles of the vaudeville routine to a fellow student,
using a hand puppet) was deemed not “transformative,” an approach which
is coming to dominate the unruly area of fair use. One might wonder
whether courts are falling into the sort of error in Kirtsaeng, making a
single factor determinative in what is a multi-factor analysis. Moreover,
“transformative” is an extremely elusive test, as TCA TV illustrates. The
court held the use was not transformative, because the character simply
performed the routine verbatim. But one could see the use as quite
transformative – going from a comedy routine hinging on two characters
misunderstanding each other to a performance by a single character (who
can’t misunderstand himself), in a manner (as the script directs) that is “a
little aspergersy.”86
Because fair use is a difficult assessment,87 fair use may be
underutilized due to risk aversion.88 When parties get advice about whether
a proposed use would be protected as fair use, even a lawyer giving pro
bono advice might be excessively cautious, out of the fear of regret.
82

TCA TV Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2016).
See Kahneman, supra note 5, at 97–101 (discussing substitution of questions).
84
See 17 U.S.C. § 107. Courts are struggling with the very existence of the quite different but
similarly named doctrine in trademark law, “nominative fair use “ See Rebecca Tushnet, Second Circuit
muddies nominative fair use more than 9th Circuit ever has, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (May 23,
2016),
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2016/05/second-circuit-muddies-nominative-fair.html
[https:/
/perma.cc/W57R-32RK] (discussing Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium v. Sec. Univ., LLC,
823 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2016)).
85
Laura Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J. L.
& ARTS 445 (2008).
86
TCA TV, 839 F.3d at 176, n.8.
87
Whether fair use outcomes are complex but predictable is another question. See Michael J.
Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004).
88
James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882 (2007).
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Although the risk of infringement may be very low, a lawyer may
overweight the small probability of infringement, especially if seeking
permission is deemed the norm. 89
D. EMI Christian Music Grp. v. MP3tunes, LLC 90
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act gives internet service providers
immunity for copyright infringement by their users.91 To qualify, providers
must, among other things, implement a notice and take down procedure,
take down infringing material it knows of, and terminate the accounts of
repeat infringers.92 The provider is not required to monitor its service or
affirmatively seek out infringing material.93 EMI Christian concerned the
balance between the duty to terminate repeat infringers and the express lack
of a duty to monitor the service or seek out infringing material.
The court reversed partial judgment for defendants, holding that there
were factual issues remaining as to whether immunity was appropriate.
Defendants, on the evidence, did not qualify for immunity with respect to a
number of works, because executives working for defendants themselves
used the services to download infringing works. But the court went well
beyond that, holding that online service providers must be scrupulous in
cancelling accounts of repeat infringers. The court held that defendants
failed “to track users who repeatedly created links to infringing content,” a
standard which seems to require more active monitoring than simply
promptly deleting infringing material.94 One might attribute the reasoning
to the halo effect: first impressions carry much more weight than later
information. 95 Once the court determined that the company was responsible
for infringement by users – because the company’s executives themselves
were infringing users – it perhaps did see the need for analyzing the statute
and precedent to determine whether the company was liable for other user
infringement, as long as there were plausible means available for the
company to discover such infringement. In cases with multiple issues, a
ruling for one side on the first issues considered may increase the
89

See Kahneman, supra note 5, at 346–49.
EMI Christian Music Grp. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 840 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2016).
91
17 U.S. Code § 512(c).
92
17 U.S. Code § 512(i)(1)(A). A rights holder is required to submit take-down notices only in
good faith, which requires considering whether posting the material is protected by fair use. Lenz v.
Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016) (amending its 2015 opinion).
93
17 U.S. Code § 512(m).
94
EMI Christian Group, 840 F.3d at 80; compare Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d
78 (2d Cir. 2016) (an employee viewing copyrighted content posted without authorization does not
constitute “red-flag” knowledge sufficient to destroy DMCA immunity).
95
Kahneman, supra note 5, at 82–85.
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likelihood of that side winning on other issues, even if they are logically
independent.
E. Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc.,96 Cheffins v. Stewart97
Estate of Graham and Cheffins touch on moral rights of artists. Many
jurisdictions outside the US recognize “moral rights” for artists, whereas
under US law artists generally must rely on the general rights afforded
under copyright, trademark, and licensing law. Estate of Graham
invalidated the California Resale Royalties Act, which requires that when
works of fine art are resold, 5% must go to the artist. The court held that
the state law was preempted because it conflicted with federal copyright’s
first sale doctrine, which authorizes the owner of a copy (including the
original) of a work to resell it, free of obligations to the copyright holder.98
One category of works does get specific moral rights (to prevent
misattribution, distortion and destruction) under the Visual Artists Rights
Act, Section 106A of the Copyright Act. Cheffins concerned the boundaries
of that set of works, “work of visual art.”99 Protected works include
“painting, drawing, print, or sculpture,” but not “applied art.”100 The court
followed Second Circuit case law that interpreted “applied art” to exclude
protection for works that are utilitarian, such as furniture that could also be
seen as sculpture.101 Under this approach, there was no protection for used
school bus called “La Contessa, a mobile replica of a 16th-century Spanish
galleon for use at the Burning Man Festival.” Although extensively
adorned, the bus still functioned as a bus, at least until the festival
organizers banned the drivers for unsafe driving.102
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Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 974 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
Cheffins v. Stewart, 825 F.3d 588 (9th Cir. 2016).
98
Estate of Graham, 178 F. Supp. at 988.
99
Cheffins, 825 F.3d at 592 (discussing protections for “works of visual art” under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A).
100
17 U.S.C. § 101.
101
Cheffins, 825 F.3d at 594 (discussing Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2003)).
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Id. at 596.
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F. Smith v. Barnesandnoble.com, LLC103

Randall Munroe, xkcd.com – “This work is licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 2.5 License.”
Louis K. Smith, author of The Hardscrabble Zone, authorized a
marketing company to promote his book, including providing free samples.
After the campaign resulted in no sales, the author terminated the
agreement. Subsequently, the author alleged copyright infringement by
Barnes and Noble, which maintained a copy in one of its customers’
“lockers,” which the customer had received as a free sample. The court
held that the license to the marketer to allow users to copy and share work
for non-commercial use protected Barnes and Nobles even after
termination, because there was no time limit on use by users of authorized
samples.
The case is one of the few cases on free licensing, broadly understood.
The best known free licenses (the General Public License for software and
Creative Commons licenses for other works) share the general goal of
making works free to share, but differ in many respects. Both, however, are
by their terms non-terminable – in order to encourage others to be able to
rely on material received under such a license. The license in Smith was not
expressly nonterminable, but interpreted that way because the relevant
103

98

Smith v. Barnesandnoble.com, LLC, 839 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2016)
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terms had no express termination provision, where other terms in the
license did.
There are few cases applying the GPL, Creative Commons, or similar
free licenses, but that may change as works under such licenses increase in
commercial importance. Linux, licensed under the GPL, runs every
Android phone and most internet servers. The most Hundreds of thousands
of works are under CC licenses, such as Wikipedia. Some CC licenses are
for non-commercial purposes only. Indeed, a substantial portion of CC
licenses permit only noncommercial uses and bar derivative works. One
could explain that in terms of loss aversion104 (the concern that someone
else may make a fortune on a work that was given away for free) or the
endowment effect (millions of works are licensed in a way that forbids
commercial use, but only a fraction of those works would appear likely to
have much commercial value, perhaps meaning that authors value their
works more highly than the market).105 Creative Commons itself recognizes
that with an appropriate response. Rather than removing the noncommercial option, the site nudges106 creators to use a license with fewer
restrictions. In general, free licensing is often seen as an issue of morality –
just as copyright owners see copyright enforcement as a moral issue. That
raises many interesting issues of moral psychology, with its tendency to
divide people into groups and conflate justice with outcomes that serve
one’s group.107 Such tendencies may encourage cooperation within the
group but foster conflict with those deemed outside the group.
Many of the terms of free licenses could be litigated. Many free
licenses permit only non-commercial use, but the line between a
commercial and noncommercial use is murky. Free licenses routinely
exclude all warranties, but the scope and effect of that exclusion could be
an issue.108

104

See Kahneman, supra note 5, at 283–86.
See Kahneman, supra note 5, at 292–97; but see Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against
Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2013)
(expressing skepticism about the endowment effect).
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See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
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See generally Joshua Greene, Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and
Them (Penguin Press 2013).
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See Stephen McJohn, The GPL Meets the UCC: Does Free Software Come with a Warranty of
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G. Dryer v. National Football League109
Dryer held that the federal copyright statute preempted state law right
of publicity claims brought by former professional football players against
NFL Films. The court reasoned that their claims would be the state law
equivalent of copyright claims. The court distinguished the case where an
announcer’s voice had been used in advertising, because that was a
commercial use of the identity, as opposed to the sort of expressive use that
copyright protects. Dryer viewed the players’ claims as analogous to claims
brought by actors in a movie: “If [a] performer [in a copyrighted recording]
later objects to the reproduction or performance of that recording in an
expressive, non-advertising use, then the claim is one of copyright
infringement, not of infringement of the right of publicity.”110 But football
players, unlike actors or musicians, are not performing a copyrighted work.
Football games are not scripted, nor was this based on some claimed
copyright in the choreography of the plays. Rather, the relevant copyright
was in the game footage. The court placed weight on the fact that NFL
films had permission to make the films.111 But the players were not
claiming to hold copyright in the films as authors; they were alleging that
use of the films infringed their state law rights of publicity. A sounder way
to resolve the case would the issue the court did reach, whether the First
Amendment would bar such a broad interpretation of the state law right of
publicity.

109

Dryer v. National Football League, 814 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 943 (quoting, in parenthetical, J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY § 11.55 (2d ed. 2013)).
111
Id. at 943.
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H. Direct Techs., LLC v. Electronic Arts, Inc.112

Design illustration reproduced in Direct Techs.
Electronic Arts(“EA”), makers of The Sims, hired Lithomania to
produce a flash drive in the shape of a PlumbBob, an icon from The Sims.
Lithomania in turn hired Direct Technologies (“DA”) make a prototype.
EA and Lithomania liked the prototype. Lithomania hired another company
who would produce item for lower cost. They nevertheless signed a
production and transfer of IP rights contract with DT, then falsely told DT
that the project was on hold. After DT settled its breach of contract and
fraud claims with Lithomania, it sued EA for copyright infringement. The
court below held that the design was not copyrightable because it was
functional and it lacked originality. The appellate court reversed, holding
there was an issue of fact as to whether the design – a “futuristic cut away
look . . . at a unique angle”– was “merely functional or utilitarian.”113

112
113

Direct Techs., LLC v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 836 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1064–66.
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I. Home Design Servs.v. Turner Heritage Homes, Inc.114 Medallion
Homes Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Tivoli Homes of Sarasota, Inc. 115

From Appendix to Medallion Homes.
114

Home Design Servs. v. Turner Heritage Homes, Inc., 825 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2016).
Medallion Homes Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Tivoli Homes of Sarasota, Inc., 656 Fed. Appx. 450 (11th
Cir. 2016).
115
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Copyright and trademark do not protect functionality; patents on
inventions do.116 Home Design Services and Medallion Homes both address
copyright’s line between protected aesthetic features and nonprotected
functional features in architectural works. In Medallion Homes, the
defendants copied a home design with “four-three split plans, that is, fourbedroom three-bathroom plans with a master bedroom on one end and three
other rooms at the other end.”117 Those shared elements were held
functional, affecting how the house would function as a home. Medallion
Homes similarly held that copying general floor plans would not infringe,
because such aspects were not protected.118
J. Newegg Inc. v. Ezra Sutton, P.A.119
Newegg brought to life a fact pattern raised in many a copyright class.
The court held that that copying substantial portions of a co-defendant’s
legal brief was not fair use.
IV.TRADE SECRET
A. The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016
Patent, copyright and trademark are generally federal law, as
illustrated by the cases above on preemption of state law by the Copyright
Act.120 There was no general federal trade secret statute. Rather, state law
governed, applying common law and then the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
adopted by 47 states. In 2016, Congress enacted the Defend Trade Secrets
Act (“DTSA”), which broadened the Espionage Act of 1996 into a general

116

See generally Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens (2016),
(Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 509), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888094
[https://perma.cc/W9NJ-E6VY]. Design patents protect the ornamental designs of functional things.
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Medallion Homes, 656 Fed. Appx. at 454.
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Home Design Svcs., 825 F.3d at 1326-1327.
119
Newegg Inc. v. Ezra Sutton, P.A., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124981 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2016).
120
State copyright law does apply to such narrow categories as pre 1972 sound recordings. See
Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 99 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that DMCA immunity
for copyright infringement includes liability for infringement of state law copyright in pre-1972 sound
recordings). Courts are still drawing the contours of the protection. See Tyler Ochoa, A Seismic Ruling
Revisited: No Common-Law Public Performance Rights in Pre-1972 Sound Recordings in New York—
Flo & Eddie v. Sirius, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (January 10, 2017), http://blog.ericgoldman.org
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Zvi S. Rosen, Common-Law Copyright, U. Cincinnati L. Rev. (forthcoming), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834199.
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trade secret act, providing for a civil cause of action and for a wide range of
remedies.
The DTSA is quite similar to the UTSA, including the definition of
misappropriation. The definition of a protected trade secret is also
substantially similar, if anything broader because it exhaustively list many
types of information. The DTSA adopted the definition under the
Economic Espionage Act, which tracks the UTSA definition, but also adds
several categories of information (plans, designs, prototypes, procedures, or
codes), and makes clear that the protected secret may be stored in any
form: “whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored,
compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing.” However, the DTSA will change trade
secret practice. First, the DTSA provides a federal cause of action and nonexclusive federal jurisdiction over trade secret cases.121Jurisdiction extends
to the limits of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.122 Almost all trade
secret cases have a commercial element, so federal jurisdiction will
generally be available. The DTSA provides double damages for willful
misappropriation and ex parte seizures with a strong showing of need. The
Act makes clear that trade secrets may be protected from disclosure in
litigation, such as through protective orders. The Act also provides certain
safeguards, such as limits on remedies that would prevent someone
practicing their profession and protections for whistleblowers. The DTSA
also provides that an injunction may not issue “merely on the information
the person knows,” rather requiring a showing of threatened
misappropriation, thereby rejecting the doctrine of “inevitable
disclosure.”123 The DTSA, unlike patent and copyright, does not preempt
state law.
B. GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG United States of America, Inc.124
After a “foray into the byzantine world of government contracting
regulations,” the court held that a government contractor misappropriated
trade secrets by studying the software code of another contractor to develop
its own software. Both contractors were working on the same project to
develop RFID technology for the Navy.125 Software AG had access to the
121
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code of GlobeRanger as part of its work. Software AG also used that access
to develop its own software, which the Navy then chose over GlobeRanger
for a bigger project.126 The court rejected several arguments of Software
AG. Under the aforementioned byzantine regulations, the ownership of the
IP did not pass to the government, although it was partially developed for
the project.127 The various security measures protecting use of the software
qualified as trade secrets, without the need to identify one key secret access
device.128 Software AG did “use” the software in the senses of
misappropriation: not by using it to manage inventory, but by using it as a
model for developing its inventory management software.129 The case also
illustrates the latitude that courts have in trade secret cases to assess
damages, due to the uncertain nature of valuing trade secrets. Damages
were properly awarded based on GlobeRanger’s cost of developing the
information, not be limited to the cost that Software AG saved by not
developing the information itself.130
C. Direct Techs., LLC v. Electronic Arts, Inc.131 McDonald Apiary, LLC v.
Starrh Bees, Inc.132
In addition to its copyright holding discussed above, Direct
Technologies held that the futuristic cut away design of the flash drive was
not a trade secret, because it lacked the requisite type of value:
EA argues that DT’s design is not a trade secret because it has no “actual or
even potential value to DT outside of a single ephemeral project for a single
customer.” DT has not presented any evidence that there was value in the
secrecy of its design. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on this ground.133

The issue could have been analyzed in more detail. Product design can
certainly be a trade secret, as evidenced by Apple’s famous secrecy around
upcoming products. Direct Technologies is hard to square with
GlobeRanger, because both involved a subcontractor using another
subcontractor’s product as a model, rather than developing its own design.
Direct Technologies’ design had enough value for Lithomania to give it to
126
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the lower-cost producer and for Lithomania to deceive Direct Technologies
into signing over the IP rights in the design. The court’s dismissive analysis
considered none of this. Rather, the court spent considerable time
discussing whether Direct Technologies had no trade secret because it did
not take reasonable security measures in handing over the design without
getting a nondisclosure agreement from Lithomania. That issue was not
clear cut, as the court noted, because in some cases taking no measures
might be reasonable, if there was an implied relationship of confidentiality.
Analyzing one issue at length and precisely, then deciding the point on
alternative grounds with perfunctory analysis, is similar to substitution;
where people ease their cognitive load by answering a different question
than asked.134 Judges are human, unconsciously seeking cognitive ease. One
study of parole judges found that the likelihood of them granting parole
was highest after each meal break, then steadily declined until the next
meal break.135
McDonald Apiary held that a database of beehive foraging locations in
western Nebraska could qualify as a trade secret.136 The court held that the
locations of the beehives could be ascertained by others, by searching the
internet or by searching by driving a car around western Nebraska. But
information may be a trade secret if it is not readily ascertainable by others,
and there is a difference between “readily ascertainable and that which
is realistically ascertainable.”137
D. United States v. Pu138
Pu was convicted under the Economic Espionage Act. An issue in
sentencing was a finding as to the intended loss of his conduct. By contrast
to GlobeRanger assessing damages in a civil case, the court held that the
value was not appropriately based on the cost of developing the trade
secret. In addition to providing yet another example of the difficulties of
valuing trade secrets, the case emphasizes the patchwork of laws implicated
by trade secret cases.
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E. Unitherm Food Sys. v. Hormel Foods Corp.139
Unitherm alleged that Hormel misappropriated a trade secret,
Unitherm’s “process for cooking sliced bacon in a spiral oven.”140 After the
trade secret claim was dismissed, Unitherm sought relief for unjust
enrichment. The court held that “to the extent Unitherm’s unjust
enrichment claim is based on the allegations that Hormel stole the
Unitherm Process, the claim fails because it is based on the same operative
facts, and is therefore preempted by, Unitherm’s dismissed claim under
Minnesota’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”141
F. ACI Worldwide Corp. v. MasterCard Techs., LLC 142
A nonparty was not required to produce software source code in
discovery, where risk to the trade secret was not proportional to the value
of resolving litigation. The nonparty was a competitor to the party seeking
discovery, and there were already alternate sources of relevant information.
The case serves to emphasize a policy specifically incorporated in the new
federal trade secret act, the need to protect trade secrets from disclosure in
litigation, through protective orders and other limits on discovery.
G. Tucson Embedded Sys., Inc. v. Turbine Powered Tech. LLC 143
Tucson Embedded System illustrates a common reason for failure of
trade secret claims. Tucson Embedded Systems sought to engage Turbine
Powered Technology to build engine control systems to control turbine
engines for use with generators at oil and gas wells. The plaintiff gave
defendant access to their equipment and various facilities as part of the
development process. The plaintiff claimed the defendant used that access
to misappropriate trade secrets. But the plaintiff never identified the
specific trade secrets, instead just generally listing types of information that
defendants had access to and the general purposes such information could
serve. The court held that to claim trade secret protection, information must
be more specifically described than such “catch-all” phrases as processes
for “retrofitting” and “modifying” an aircraft engine for use as generator.
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H. Highland Capital Mgmt., LP v. Looper Reed & McGraw, P.C.144
Highland Capital sued a former employee for allegedly
misappropriating trade secrets, then sued the former employee’s lawyers,
for allegedly misappropriating those trade secrets while representing him.145
The court held that the law firm was protected by attorney immunity for
acts within scope of representation.146 A lawyer has immunity for alleged
wrongdoing in the course of client representation, although the lawyer
would not be immune for acts that were independent of the representation
(such as “an attorney who participates in a fraudulent business scheme with
his client or assaults opposing counsel during a trial”).147
I. Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam148
Trade secret misappropriation is often difficult to show. Another
means that employers may use to protect information is to have employees
sign promises not to work for competitors. Those promises raised public
policy issues because they limit a person’s ability to make a living (and
more broadly, may slow innovation). California law generally does not
enforce covenants not to compete. Other jurisdictions enforce covenants
not to compete, provided they are reasonable. In Golden Road Motor Inn,
Nevada declined to adopt the “blue pencil” doctrine, holding that an
overbroad covenant not to compete will not be reformed and enforced to a
reasonable extent.149
J. United States v. Nosal150
Until the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, there was no general
federal trade secret law. But the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has
occupied much of the area. The CFAA prohibits “unauthorized access” to
computers. That clearly prohibits hacking into a system to steal trade
secrets. Some courts have read “unauthorized” access broadly enough to
cover actions of an employee to access information in violation of the
employment contract, such as downloading a customer list to take to a
future employer. The bulk of trade secret cases involve employees,
144
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especially those going to competitors, so the CFAA effectively gave federal
trade secret protection to trade secrets (and other information that would
not qualify as a trade secret) stored on employer’s computer networks –and
today, most information goes through a computer. Other courts have read
“unauthorized” more narrowly, not to cover cases where an employee had
authority to access the network, but used that access in a way contrary to
the employer’s interests.
Nosal shows that there remain many variations of the “authorized
access” question. An earlier opinion in the same case had held there was no
CFAA violation by an executive recruiter using his access to get
information that he later took to help start a competing firm, a narrow
reading of unauthorized. But Nosal followed that with a holding that could
be read to fall in the broad camp. The court held that once the employee
had been notified that his authority to use the employer’s computer network
was terminated, he violated the CFAA by using another employee’s user
name and password to access the network, to search the employer’s
database of information on executives. Broadly interpreted, that could
mean that password sharing violates the CFAA. But future courts could
limit the holding to the facts of the case – deliberately using another’s
credentials to make access that had been prohibited.

109

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

110

